





The Wealth of Zaibatsu Owner Families: The Impact of Zaibatsu 






Contrary to widely accepted views, the former zaibatsu owner families, despite the drastic reduction in their enormous 
wealth, emerged from the U.S. Occupation with relatively sizable assets. The Holding Company Liquidation Commission, the 
Japanese agency that at the direction of Occupation Headquarters (GHQ) seized stocks that the zaibatsu families had held either 
directly or through their holding companies, worked to protect the families, especially by convincing GHQ to switch compensation 
from nonnegotiable bonds to cash. Furthermore, in the sale of stocks, the policy of giving purchase priority to zaibatsu company 
employees appears to have made it possible in some cases for the families to buy back shares and regain control over their former 
enterprises after 1952. As it turned out, the confiscatory measure was not so much the appropriation of the families’ assets under 




Mitsui Takanaga, who graduated from Dartmouth College in 1915,1 was heading one of the eleven Mitsui 
families when the U.S. occupation of Japan officially began at the end of August 1945. As such, Takanaga would find 
himself on the list of 56 zaibatsu family members designated in March 1947 by the Holding Company Liquidation 
Commission (HCLC), the Japanese body that carried out Occupation directives to break up the zaibatsu combines and 
big companies. Under this designation, Takanaga had to transfer all of his personally held stocks and bonds to the 
commission, having already turned over securities he owned through Mitsui’s central holding company in October 
1946. He was also forced to resign from offices he held in five Mitsui enterprises.2 In the meantime, in February 1947, 
he had to declare his taxable assets to the Ministry of Finance under the 1946 capital levy, which would take a full 87 






1Takanaga would send two of his sons to Dartmouth as members of the Classes of 1943 and 1958. Takanobu ’43 wrote an account of his wartime 
years at Dartmouth for the November/December 2010 issue of the college alumni magazine: 
http://archive.dartmouthalumnimagazine.com/issue/20101101#!&pid=22 
2Mochikabu Kaisha Seiri Iinkai, ed., Nihon zaibatsu to sono kaitai (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1974), vol. 2, 2-3. 
3 Kunio Suzuki, “From Zaibatsu to Corporate Complexes,” in Takao Shiba and Masahiro Shimotani, eds., Beyond the Firm: Business Groups in 
International and Historical Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 75. 
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Figure 1: Mitsui Takanaga (1892–1962), Dartmouth Class of 1915 
 
The Dartmouth Class of 1915 newsletter for 1947 informed 
Takanaga’s classmates that “the Mitsuis have lost holdings, most of their 
money,” and the newsletter for 1951 added that “both of his homes in Tokyo 
were completely demolished.”4 His Dartmouth alumni file contains a New 
York Times clipping from November 28, 1946, describing the dramatic 
contraction of zaibatsu wealth that was soon to occur. The article reported 
that all the assets of Mitsui and the rest of “Japan’s ten wealthiest families 
have been frozen by order of Gen. Douglas MacArthur in a move to end 
permanently their influence upon the empire’s economy.” It went on to detail 
the exacting conditions that the government, at the direction of Occupation 
headquarters (GHQ or SCAP after MacArthur’s title, Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers), was about to impose on Mitsui and other zaibatsu 
families, allotting them monthly living expenses of ¥1,500 or about $30 and 
seizing their belongings in return for bonds “upon which the families will be 
unable even to borrow.”5 
Historians of Japan have debated the extent to which the 1945-1952 Allied occupation represented a rupture 
in modern Japanese history. In the business field, many see Occupation programs to break up the zaibatsu, the family-
owned combines that had dominated Japan’s pre-1945 economy, as having been only partially successful, as former 
zaibatsu subsidiaries largely escaped deconcentration and tended to regroup after 1952. By comparison, business 
reforms in occupied Germany appear more thoroughgoing, in part because the somewhat later start of the Japanese 
reforms overlapped more with the intensification of the Cold War. 
On one aspect of the zaibatsu dissolution program, however, scholars generally agree that a permanent break 
occurred, namely, in family ownership and control, a defining characteristic of the zaibatsu combines. The fall from 
grace of Mitsui Takanaga would certainly seem to support that position. In the standard interpretation, the divestiture 
of owner-family stocks amounted to virtual confiscation of zaibatsu family wealth, ending the families’ commanding 
economic, if not social, position in the emerging middle-class society of postwar Japan. Hugh Patrick typifies the 
common view: 
The holding companies were ended, and all shares in the underlying companies owned by zaibatsu family 
members were confiscated and sold, both to employees of the constituent firms . . . and gradually, on the open market, 
to large numbers of middle-income Japanese. In compensation the zaibatsu families received bonds that bore no 
interest and could not be sold or redeemed for ten years, and zaibatsu family members were not even permitted to 
work for the firms they formerly had owned. All this was so effective that the families have never been able to return 
to power; by and large they have slipped into comfortable obscurity . . . 6Or, as a textbook on postwar Japanese 
history succinctly—and misleadingly—puts it: “Zaibatsu families were nearly impoverished when their assets were 
confiscated.”7 
 
4Dartmouth Class of 1915 Newsletter, September 1947 and April 1951, Rauner Library Special Collections, Dartmouth College 
5Burton Crane, “Zaibatsu Assets Frozen in Japan, Holdings of Ten Wealthiest Families Will Be Put into Non-Negotiable Bonds,” New York 
Times, November 28, 1946, 19. 
6Hugh T. Patrick, “The Phoenix Risen from the Ashes: Postwar Japan,” in James B. Crowley, ed., Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 305 
7Gary D. Allinson, Japan’s Postwar History, 2nd ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 75 
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I argue in this article that, despite the drastic reduction in their enormous wealth, the former zaibatsu owner 
families emerged from the Occupation with relatively sizable assets. The Japanese commission that implemented the 
U.S.-mandated business reforms, the HCLC, worked to protect the zaibatsu families especially by convincing 
Occupation headquarters to switch compensation from nonnegotiable bonds to cash, a point that is totally absent from 
the literature. Furthermore, in the disposal of stocks, the policy of giving purchase priority to zaibatsu company 
employees appears to have made it possible in some cases for the families to buy back shares as well as regain control 
over their former enterprises after 1952. 
  
Zaibatsu families in fact sustained a greater hit to their pre-1945 wealth from a program whose origins had 
nothing to do with zaibatsu dissolution—the 1946 capital levy. The Ministry of Finance proposed this sharply 
graduated tax, which the Diet passed in November 1946, to secure funds to pay off the vast amounts of bonds the 
government had issued during the war.8 The capital levy applied to individuals whose net assets exceeded ¥100,000 
as of March 3, 1946. The tax rates climbed from 10 percent on the first ¥10,000 of taxable assets above the ¥100,000 
exemption to 90 percent on the portion of taxable assets exceeding ¥15 million. The Ministry, however, made the levy 
more burdensome by applying it not to individuals but to families, calculating the tax by the net wealth of the 
household and distributing individual tax liability proportionately among its members. Families would typically have 
to meet their tax obligations by payment not only of cash but also of bonds, stocks, and real estate. As Suzuki Kunio 
notes, the capital levy “made it legally possible for the state to siphon off a considerable portion of the wealth of the 
zaibatsu and other wealthy families in the form of taxes.”9 The ten largest zaibatsu family groups had a total of about 
¥630 million confiscated under the levy, for an overall tax rate of 85 percent. The individual with the biggest taxable 
assets, Sumitomo Kichizaemon, lost 89 percent of those assets to the levy.10 
Figure 2: Impact of the Capital Levy on Reported Taxable Assets 
 
 
Source: Suzuki, “Zaibatsu kaitai, zaisan zei to zaibatsu kazoku shisan no shukushō,” 2. 
 
8From the standpoint of the U.S. Occupation, however—as Henry Shavell, financial adviser to SCAP’s Finance Division, claimed—the primary 
purpose of the levy was non-fiscal: “to level off excessive concentrations of economic power, and to virtually wipe out the equities of . . . the 
Zaibatsu.” Shavell, “Taxation Reform in Occupied Japan,” National Tax Journal, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 1948), 127. 
9Suzuki, “From Zaibatsu to Corporate Complexes,” 74. 
10Suzuki Kunio, “Zaibatsu kaitai, zaisan zei to zaibatsu kazoku shisan no shukushō,” Saitama Daigaku Sōgō Kenkyū Kikō (2010), 
http://sucra.saitama-u.ac.jp/modules/xoonips/download.php/KP22A10-65.pdf?file_id=22465. 
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Figure 3: List of Zaibatsu Family Members Designated by the HCLC 
on March 13, 1947.  
 
 
 Meanwhile, under the Occupation’s trust-busting 
program, three HCLC actions in particular affected the business 
ownership and control of the zaibatsu families: the naming as 
“designated holding companies” of the zaibatsu head offices 
beginning in September 1946, the naming of 56 zaibatsu family 
members as “designated persons” in March 1947, and the 
enforcement of the “Law Concerning Elimination of Control by 
Zaibatsu Families” in January 1948. From October 1946 to late 
1947, the HCLC took custody of all the stocks owned by 83 
designated holding companies.11 Of the stocks of zaibatsu head 
offices, owner family members held 64 percent of the total in the 
case of Mitsui, 48 percent in the case of Mitsubishi, 83 percent 
in the case of Sumitomo, and 100 percent in that of Yasuda. The 
family stock ownership percentages for second-tier zaibatsu 
holding companies ranged from 59 percent for Furukawa and 68 
percent for Asano to 93 percent for Ōkura and 100 percent for 
both Nomura and Nakajima.12 (Insurance companies were the 
principal stockholders other than zaibatsu family members.) Of 
the big four zaibatsu, the holding-company stocks of family 
members taken by the HCLC amounted to roughly ¥630 million 
for Mitsui, ¥340 million for Mitsubishi, $260 million for 
Sumitomo, and ¥145 million for Yasuda.13 Because corporations 
were exempt from the capital levy, the Ministry of Finance 
presumably did not include these holding-company shares in 
figuring the taxable assets of zaibatsu family members. 






 Source: GHQ, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, vol. 24, Appendix 22. 
 
The HCLC initiated the seizure of holding company stocks on October 8, 1946, when a group of 
commissioners descended on the main offices of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi holding companies in Tokyo, loaded on 
 
11On the designation, dissolution, and reorganization of holding companies, see General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, vol. 24: Elimination of Zaibatsu Control (Tokyo: SCAP, 1952), 
Chapter 2: “Liquidation of Holding Companies,” available on microfilm, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1989, reel 4. 
12Mochikabu Kaisha Seiri Iinkai, ed., Nihon zaibatsu to sono kaitai, vol. 2, pp. 6-20; Holding Company Liquidation Commission, Final Report 
on Zaibatsu Dissolution (Tokyo: HCLC, 1951), pp. 30-39; “Zaibatsu Families and Their Stockholdings,” 1945, SCAP Economic and Scientific 
Section Records, available in The Occupation of Japan: Economic Reform, Part 1: Deconcentration and Modernization of Economic Power 
(Bethesda, MD: Congressional Information Service/Tokyo: Maruzen, 1994-1995), microfiche 4-116-04. 
13Calculated by multiplying the total values of holding-company securities transferred to the HCLC by the percentages of owner-family held 
securities. Holding Company Liquidation Commission, Final Report, 31, 33-34, 39, 41. 
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to two trucks 46 sealed wooden boxes containing ¥1.25 billion in stock and bond certificates, and, escorted by armed 
MP guards, brought the securities to the Hypothec Bank of Japan, next to the HCLC offices, for storage pending their 
disposal.14 Following this dramatic photo opportunity, the commission proceeded over the next three weeks to secure 
the stocks of the holding companies of the other big four zaibatsu—Sumitomo and Yasuda—as well as Nakajima 
Aircraft15 in this first round of designations. 
 
 
Figure 4: Seizure of Zaibatsu Family Assets, October 1946.   




Besides disposing of the stocks that zaibatsu family members held through their combines’ holding 
companies, the HCLC also gained authority to deal with the members’ direct holdings, and in March 1947 the 
 
14Noda Iwajirō, Zaibatsu kaitai shiki: watashi no rirekisho (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1983), p. 65; T. A. Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution in 
Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), 109-110. 
15Morikawa Hidemasa states that, although Nakajima Aircraft (part of which became Fuji Heavy Industries in 1950) may not fit the criteria for a 
zaibatsu head office, SCAP grouped it with the top four zaibatsu holding companies because all of Nakajima’s capital came from one family and 
“because it controlled a number of subsidiaries and cooperated in the war effort.” Morikawa, Zaibatsu: The Rise and Fall of Family Enterprise 
Groups in Japan (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1992), 237. 
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government named 56 members of ten zaibatsu family groups as “designated persons” who would have to transfer 
their personally held securities to the commission.16 These individuals held a total of ¥1.2 billion yen in securities. 
The Ministry of Finance appropriated about half this amount as payment for the capital levy while the HCLC took 
over the remaining securities, valued at ¥546 million, in April 1948.17 
At the direction of Occupation authorities, the government also ordered the designated persons to give up 
their positions as company officers, eliminating their ability to exercise managerial control over enterprises. SCAP 
was concerned, however, that the families could maintain indirect influence through appointees. The extension of the 
purge directive of January 4, 1946 to the economic field exactly one year later had led to the barring of 1,335 
executives from top positions in private companies (as well as 631 executives in enterprises of a “government-cum-
business character”).18 SCAP, however, had not drafted the economic purge with special reference to the combines 
but had “sprayed” it generally over a list of several hundred big businesses; that list, for instance, had omitted six of 
the twenty-two first-line subsidiaries of the Mitsui zaibatsu.19 
To close the gap, the Occupation had the Japanese government enact the “Law for the Termination of 
Zaibatsu Family Control” on January 7, 1948.20 As MacArthur explained to Under Secretary of the Army William 
Draper in a radio message two days later, this legislation was “an integral part of the program for the dissolution of 
the powerful octopus of monopolistic financial, industrial and commercial combines.” Its purpose was “to terminate 
the control or influence over Zaibatsu enterprises” that the 56 designated family heads “are still exercising by virtue 
of securities and officerships held by members of [their] immediate families” or through officials appointed by them; 
it thereby aimed “to avoid defeat of the deconcentration program through the use of ‘fronts’ related to the Zaibatsu by 
ties of blood or by feudalistic allegiances.”21 The law required immediate relatives of the 56 designated persons to 
resign from high-ranking offices in designated zaibatsu affiliates and barred them from holding such positions for ten 
years; in all, 309 family members faced removal from office. High-ranking appointees designated for removal faced 
the same exclusion provisions but could apply for exemption. Of the 3,489 officers affected by the law (including 848 
already purged individuals), 691 obtained exemptions, with the remaining 2,798 officers forced to resign from the 
specified positions.22 
Figure 5: Number of Families and Family Members Affected by the “Law Concerning Elimination of Control by Zaibatsu 
Families,” January 7, 1948 
 
Source: GHQ, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, vol. 24, Appendix 23. 
 
16Mochikabu Kaisha Seiri Iinkai, ed., Nihon zaibatsu to sono kaitai, vol. 2, 2-3. 
17Mochikabu Kaisha Seiri Iinkai, ed., Nihon zaibatsu to sono kaitai, vol. 1, 301. 
18T. A. Bisson, “The Economic Purge in Japan,” Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3 (May 1953), 283, 287. 
19Ibid., 285, 288, 297. 
20For the text of the law, see Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 293-301. 
21Douglas MacArthur to William Draper, radio message, January 9, 1948, SCAP Economic and Scientific Section Records, The Occupation of 
Japan: Economic Reform, Part 1, microfiche 4-101-38. 
22Bisson, “The Economic Purge,” 294; General Headquarters, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities of the Occupation of Japan, vol. 24, p. 
137 for the number of affected family members and p. 142 for the number of purged appointees. 
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The zaibatsu families endured strict supervision of their financial affairs by the HCLC until the commission’s 
dissolution in July 1951. The designated members had to obtain permission from the HCLC for any sale of their 
remaining personal assets. They had to submit detailed lists of movable and immovable properties to the commission, 
which would make spot inspections to check the “numbers, quality and state of preservation”23 of art works, curios, 
antiques, and the like. In September 1947, the HCLC notified the designees that, if it deemed it necessary, it would 
transfer such objects—some of which were national treasures—to the Tokyo National Museum. The commission in 
fact initiated such transfers in December of that year beginning with items owned jointly by the Mitsui families. By 
April 1948, with the HCLC’s blessing, the National Museum had concluded a contract with Mitsui family members 
to take possession of art objects at a price of ¥4.7 million.24 
The heads of the ten zaibatsu family groups would deposit proceeds from sales with a bank designated by 
the HCLC. They would be able to withdraw funds only with the commission’s counter-signature and only for the 
purpose of paying taxes, repaying debts, meeting calls on unpaid capital, or providing for living expenses. The HCLC 
required the designated persons to submit quarterly budgets of living expenses. In the second quarter of 1947, for 
example, it approved average monthly living expenditures for 422 family members of ¥1,000 per person.25  
Between May 1947 and June 1950, the HCLC processed over 200 applications by zaibatsu family members 
for permission to sell or purchase property, borrow funds or repay loans, accept positions as company officers, and 
withdraw funds for living expenses. The commission usually gave permission for the sale of movable property such 
as pictures, books, automobiles, and mining rights. It tended to approve the sale of art objects to the National Museum 
but “not necessarily to private persons.” Meanwhile, the HCLC greenlighted almost all applications for the sale of 
immovable assets such as buildings and residential or forest land. By March 1950, the families had disposed of 
immovable properties worth twice as much as the movables they had sold, as the price of art objects and antiques 
plummeted while that of real estate rose. Also, by that time the designees had made three fifths of approved 
withdrawals for tax payments and just one fifth for living expenses. The HCLC approved applications for corporate 
positions, which came mainly from less affluent family members in need of extra income, if the positions were “not 
of great responsibility” and “would not lead to a concentration of power.”26 
 The same restrictions on withdrawal of funds applied to proceeds from the HCLC’s disposal of 
zaibatsu family-owned securities. The original plan was that the families would receive payment for their securities 
and other property in 3-percent public bonds that were nonnegotiable, nontransferable, and ineligible for use as 
collateral for ten years.27 According to Noda Iwajirō, the executive commissioner and later chairman of the HCLC, 
the commission strenuously objected to compensating the zaibatsu families in this manner: How were the families to 
eat? Arguing that U.S. taxpayers would have to support the zaibatsu households, the HCLC finally convinced the 
Occupation authorities to switch the compensation from bonds to cash.28 Accordingly, on June 9, 1947, the 
government amended the HCLC ordinance to permit money payments.29 SCAP records suggest that GHQ intended 
this change to apply only to payment of taxes, living expenses, and the like, and the literature continues to maintain 
that the zaibatsu families received compensation in highly restricted bonds. But Noda states in his memoir that in fact, 
as the disposal of both the holding-company and personally held stocks of the zaibatsu families proceeded, the HCLC 
made sure to reimburse them in cash.30 
 
23Holding Company Liquidation Commission, Final Report, 67. 
24General Headquarters, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities, vol. 24, 128-129. 
25Ibid., 125. 
26Ibid., 130-132; Suzuki, “Zaibatsu kaitai, zaisan zei.” 
27Bisson, Zaibatsu Dissolution, 74. 
28Noda, Zaibatsu kaitai shiki, 150-151. 
29General Headquarters, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities, vol. 24, 126. 
30Noda, Zaibatsu kaitai shiki, 151. 
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Figure 6: Members of the Executive Committee of the Holding Company Liquidation Commission (Noda Iwajirō is seated 




Source: Noda, Zaibatsu kaitai shiki, 61. 
 
 
Although both SCAP records and the HCLC’s own final report claimed that the commission exercised 
vigorous oversight of the zaibatsu families’ personal property, Noda made it clear that the HCLC would only dispose 
of assets that the owner families disclosed to the commission and would not go on “fishing expeditions” in search of 
undeclared assets. When some staff members suggested the HCLC should look into the Nomura family’s collection 
of valuable Noh costumes, for instance, Noda insisted that “investigating such items is not the job of the 
commission.”31 He also held in strict confidence the lists of assets the families submitted, refusing to show the lists 
even when the Tax Office asked to see them. He attributed the smooth operation of the divestiture program to these 
procedures.32 Noda further persuaded SCAP to modify its decision to require that the families sell all their residential 
properties other than main residences and instead allow each family to keep one villa (bessō) to “maintain a minimum 
living standard.”33 
On a similar note, Edward Welsh, the zealous New Dealer who headed the Antitrust and Cartels Division of 
GHQ from 1947 to 1950 and waged a relentless, though only partially successful, campaign to break up Japan’s large 
corporations,34 sounded surprisingly accommodative toward the zaibatsu families as reported in a New York Times 





34Prior to his SCAP appointment, Welsh had completed a doctoral dissertation at Ohio State University on trust dissolution and the impact of 
monopoly on prices and had served as an economist in several U.S. government agencies. Theodore Cohen, who headed SCAP’s Labor Division, 
describes Welsh as having had “a stubbornness and an inflexibility” about trust-busting; he was “both strong-willed yet narrowly focused . . . 
with an overweening sense of mission.” Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal, ed. Herbert Passin (New 
York: Free Press, 1987), 352. 
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Figure 7: Edward Welsh, Chief of the 
Antitrust and Cartels Division, 1947-
1950. Source: Noda, Zaibatsu kaitai 
shiki, 71. 
 




have been permitted to draw what 
funds they need for family budgets. 
Invariably family heads’ quarterly 
estimates of household expenses are 
approved, the commission merely taking care to keep the former plutocrats from amassing funds and buying back 
their own properties.” Furthermore, Welsh had assured the Times reporter that no sales of the families’ confiscated 
shares “had been made without written recommendation on the price from the former owner” and that “hardly ever . 




Welsh may well have been trying to counter mounting criticism of SCAP’s trust-busting program in the 
conservative U.S. press. Just over a year earlier, for example, the Chicago Daily Tribune had run an article succinctly 
titled “Burglary,” charging that Welsh had “promulgated a new order to rob every member of Japan’s 56 wealthiest 
families [sic] of all personal belongings not ‘directly necessary for ordinary existence’” in what amounted to “the 
biggest burglary in history.” The article claimed that Welsh was “demanding an inventory of every possession down 
to underwear and sox from all the Japanese on the list” and was “attempting to put into effect New Deal social leveling 
theories” that “cannot at the moment be saddled on Americans”: “Even in Germany, where the American occupation 
has been vengeful and stupid, no such holdup as this has been contemplated.”36 
The comparison with German industrialists had very much colored U.S. views of their Japanese counterparts 
in the initial plans for trust-busting in Japan, but the heads of families who owned big businesses in Germany, Krupp 
being the prime example, in fact suffered much worse than zaibatsu family heads did. The China hands who were 
ascendant in Washington as the occupation of Japan started had insisted, as Owen Lattimore declared in early 
September 1945, that the zaibatsu families had “merged completely with the militarists in controlling Japan for 
aggression”: “Together,” Lattimore asserted in a simile that MacArthur and many others repeated, “they are like a 
small octopus with huge tentacles which holds everything in its power.”37 Along the same lines, as a New York Times 
correspondent reported in December of that year, the zaibatsu, “at least in the opinion of many Americans, shared the 
responsibility for Japanese aggression and took part of its profits, holding much the same position as the German 
industrialists under Hitler—now officially adjudged criminal.”38 
 
 
35Burton Crane, “Zaibatsu Break-up Nearly Complete: Deconcentration Review Board Names Only 50 Japanese Companies,” New York Times, 
January 15, 1949, 4. 
36“Burglary,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 10, 1947, 20. 
37“Big Industrialists of Japan Assailed: Owen Lattimore Says Allies Must Free Nation of Their Grip to Insure Democracy,” New York Times, 
September 5, 1945. 
38“Lindesay Parrott, “Japan’s Ruling Class Still Largely Intact: Most War-Makers Are Free Although Their Machine Has Been Dismantled,” New 
York Times, December 9, 1945, 72. 
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Yet, despite such negative views of the zaibatsu, other than Ministry of Finance officials with their punitive 
capital levy, U.S. and Japanese authorities ended up treating the zaibatsu families fairly. As Noda himself concluded 
on the compensation issue, “popular opinion tends to be that zaibatsu assets were confiscated, but we as members of 
the HCLC persuaded SCAP to give the zaibatsu proper compensation in cash.”39 SCAP did declare two of the 56 
designated zaibatsu family heads to be “war criminal suspects”—Nakajima Chikuhei and Aikawa Gisuke— but 
released both of them from suspicion as war criminals in October 1947.40 Ultimately, for “lack of evidence,” no other 
designated person was accused of war crimes, though, if SCAP had followed the criteria applied to German 
industrialists, Dartmouth grad Mitsui Takanaga, for one, perhaps would have been accused, as he had helped manage 
Mitsui Mining, which had used over 1,800 Allied prisoners of war as slave labor in its Ōmuta coal mine.41 
 
By contrast, the head of the family that owned the Krupp combine was tried and “convicted for slave labor 
and for the plunder of occupied Europe” and sentenced to twelve years in prison, “his entire fortune confiscated.”42 
Much as in the case of the zaibatsu and their identification with Japan’s wartime government, the Krupp conglomerate 
“had become indelibly associated with the Nazi regime.” The harsh fate that befell Alfred Krupp following a U.S. 
successor trial to Nuremberg resulted largely from the combine’s inhuman treatment of forced workers from 
concentration camps, for unlike their Japanese counterparts Krupp companies left a paper trail of their use of slave 
labor.43 On the other hand, much as SCAP cancelled designations of all 56 zaibatsu family members in July 1951 and 
permitted purged appointees to resume their old positions, the Allied High Commissioner in Germany amnestied 
Alfred Krupp and revoked the confiscation of his property in January 1951; two years later he would return to the 
direction of Krupp.44 
 
The standard view for the occupation of Japan is that trust-busting permanently separated owner family 
members from their former combine firms. Yet the method by which the HCLC disposed of family-owned stock made 
it possible in at least one case for a zaibatsu family head to reclaim ownership and control of an ex-combine subsidiary. 
In disposing of confiscated stocks, the HCLC was to give purchase preference first to employees of each issuing firm 
and then to local residents at the sites of the company’s branches and factories.45 The commission was next to offer 
shares to brokers for resale to the public and finally to put up for public auction any remaining stocks. By March 1950, 
of stocks worth more than ¥4 billion in paid-up value that the HCLC had sold, some 39 percent had gone to employees 
and about a fourth each to bidders in public auctions and to buyers in brokerage resales.46 According to Noda Iwajirō, 
the employee-first policy enabled Ōkura Kishichirō to prevent one of his former subsidiaries, a hotel and golf resort, 
from falling into the clutches of a scrap-iron dealer from Kyushu. This upstart (narikin) businessman had promised to 
erect a statue of Kishichirō if he could acquire the resort from hotel employees who had obtained most of the stocks. 
The employees managed to thwart the Kyushu industrialist’s bid by selling their shares back to Kishichirō.47 Ōkura 
had invested heavily in mining and trade before the surrender, but after the Occupation Kishichirō focused on hotel 
management, ironically hiring Noda, who had overseen the expropriation and sale of Ōkura zaibatsu stocks, to serve 




40General Headquarters, SCAP, History of the Nonmilitary Activities, vol. 24, 126. 
41Linda Goetz Holmes, “Mitsui: ‘We Will Send You to Omuta,’” in Peter Li, ed., Japanese War Crimes: The Search for Justice (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 107-116. 
42 Harold James, Krupp: A History of the Legendary German Firm (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 224. I am grateful to my 
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With the ending of their designated status, some members of other zaibatsu families also took up managerial 
positions, and even in more recent years the descendants of the families have been “sprinkled liberally throughout the 
roster of Japanese big business, sometimes in companies stemming from former zaibatsu segments.”48 In the mid-
1990s, for instance, a great-grandson of the founder of Mitsubishi, Iwasaki Yatarō, headed Mitsubishi Bank, and three 
great-grandsons of Yatarō’s brother Yanosuke were top officers at other companies. Meanwhile, four great-grandsons 
of Yasuda zaibatsu founder Zenjirō held high-ranking positions in various firms, and the sons of two of them were 
rising executives in Fuji Bank, successor to the former Yasuda Bank, “the financial wellspring of Yasuda 
enterprises.”49 These examples, however, hardly amount to the reestablishment of former zaibatsu control over big 
businesses in Japan. 
 
The zaibatsu families certainly suffered drastic reductions in their wealth, but they did so for reasons other 
than the zaibatsu dissolution program. The families took big hits from the capital levy that deprived them of huge 
portions of their assets, from the land reform that destroyed their positions as absentee landlords,50 and above all from 
runaway inflation. But the 56 designated persons received substantial compensation for the securities they transferred 
to the HCLC: from December 1945 to December 1950 their net assets declined by a moderate 17 percent in nominal 
value.51 The top three zaibatsu family groups did far better than the average for the designated ten groups. Just for 
their estimated shares of holding-company stock sold by the HCLC, the Mitsui families netted nearly $1.2 billion on 
shares with a total paid-up value of about ¥630 million; the Mitsubishi families, almost ¥550 million on shares worth 
about ¥340 million; and the Sumitomo clan, around ¥460 million on shares worth about ¥260 million. But Yasuda, 
like most of the second-tier zaibatsu, failed to recoup full value, netting only ¥90 million on ¥145 million in paid-up 
holding-company stock.52 Because of triple-digit inflation, however, the actual value of the family groups’ combined 
net assets plummeted by 97 percent.53 
 




Source: Based on data in HCLC, Final Report, pp. 31, 33-34, 39, 41. 
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Still, if one assumes a conservative figure of ¥50,000 for the average net assets of the 97 percent of Japanese 
unaffected by the capital levy, then the levy caused the taxable net assets of members of the designated zaibatsu 
families to fall from 308 times those of non-levy payers to 47 times.54 But, for Mitsui family members, if one includes 
the estimated compensation for the families’ untaxed holding-company stocks, the figure rises to some 59 times the 
average for Japanese who were exempt from the capital levy. Considering a recent estimate that in Japan today 
corporate CEOs earn 62 times the average person’s salary,55 one would have to conclude that zaibatsu dissolution 
under the Occupation hardly relegated Mitsui Takanaga and other ex-zaibatsu family members to the mass middle 
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